Simon Flynn is training as a child and adolescent psychotherapist at the Tavistock Clinic and working clinically in the NHS. Before this, he completed a doctorate on contemporary fiction and children's literature at Cardiff University and was a lecturer in English and children's literature at several universities. Simon has published a series of articles on the BBC Children's Hour broadcasts, in particular looking at the programme's construction of evacuees and evacuation during the Second World War and the celebrated adaptations of John Masefield's novel The Box of Delights. He is interested in the way Kleinian and post-Kleinian psychotherapeutic writings use literary texts and also in the relationships between psychoanalysis and science fiction. 1 It was one of the first, 2 and remains to date the most multi-and interdisciplinary volume on childhood to be published, engaging with constructivist approaches to childhood 3 across a range of disciplines, from psychology to film studies, from literature to history. All the chapters in the book took as their starting point the idea that childhood (but also any identity) is a historically and culturally contingent construction, not an essential, transhistorical or transcultural continuity, predetermined by inherent biological or physiological factors. As discussed in the introduction to Children in Culture, 4 the approach that definitions and perceptions of childhood change through time and from place to place, and within times and places, has been widely attributed to the French historian Philippe Ariès's famous, and still controversial, book Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life, where Ariès famously argued that:
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But have we any right to talk of a history of the family? Is the family a phenomenon any more subject to history than instinct is? It is possible to argue that it is not, and to maintain that the family partakes of the immobility of the species. It is no doubt true that since the beginning of the human race men have built homes and begot children, and it can be argued that within the great family types, monogamous and polygamous, historical differences are of little importance in comparison with the huge mass of what remains unchanged. On the other hand, the great demographic revolution in the West, from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, has revealed to us considerable possibilities of change in structures hitherto believed to be invariable because they were biological. ... I accordingly looked back Introduction: Voice, Agency and the Child into our past, to find out whether the idea of the family had not been born comparatively recently, at a time when the family had freed itself from both biology and law to become a value, a theme of expression, an occasion of emotion.
5
Children in Culture drew on elaborations of this idea in critical psychology, in the work of Valerie Walkerdine, 6 Rex and Wendy Stainton Rogers, 7 and Erica Burman, 8 and in cultural studies and literary and critical theory, in the work of Jacqueline Rose, 9 James Kincaid 10 and Carolyn Steedman 11 (Valerie Walkerdine, Erica Burman and Rex and Wendy Stainton Rogers contributed to Children in Culture, and Erica Burman contributes to this volume also, considering the child in discourses of gender and capitalism).
Since Children in Culture, there have been further changes in approaches to childhood, most significantly perhaps in the development and consolidation of what are now called 'childhood studies', an interdisciplinary field emerging from the early 1990s, largely developed from the sociology of childhood, and taking much of its theoretical bases from that area, notably the work of eminent sociologists Jens Qvortrup, Chris Jenks, Allison James and Alan Prout.
12 It should be noted, however, that Qvortrup's work can be defined (as he too defines it) as being from a 'structural perspective', 13 while Jenks, James and Prout introduced a constructivist approach in to the sociology of childhood and childhood studies.
This second volume, Children in Culture, Revisited: Further Approaches to Childhood, is prompted by two considerations: first, however interdisciplinary childhood studies may strive to be, it still defines itself broadly in terms of a division between the social sciences (especially sociology, psychology and education with to a lesser extent anthropology) and the humanities, not the wider multi-and interdisciplinarity (in fact, it might be justly described as 'transdisciplinarity') that the first Children in Culture embraced. As Jens Qvortrup, William Corsaro and Michael Sebastian Honig write in their introduction to The Palgrave Handbook of Childhood Studies:
The formulation [of the title] is not intended to monopolize the concept of childhood, as some might object -in particular since not all disciplines preoccupied with children are equally well represented. We are well aware of this fact and we do not seek to disguise that the volume is primarily about children and childhood in a broader social scientific context. 14 The interdisciplinarity of both volumes of Children in Culture is, importantly, not simply a case of including as many fields as possible for their own sake or for the sake of some principle of inclusivity, but is specifically argued to have theoretically and methodologically important effects and implications. Although much has changed with respect to approaches to childhood, this is one aspect which, in our view, remains under-explored, and it is the aim of this volume to demonstrate further what this kind of 'interdisciplinarity' (or transdisciplinarity) is exactly about. As with the first volume, it is important to stress that although many fields are included in this volume in terms of their engagement with childhood, this is not a random bundling together of otherwise separate and self-contained disciplines, but that the underlying constructivist approaches shared by all unite these chapters, even where the forms of constructivism used may differ and vary somewhat in turn across the volume. It is the way that certain understandings of constructivism, however, enable the analyses of assumptions and perspectives across what are usually held to be disparate fields that enables otherwise unanticipated links between these fields to be made. What are deemed to be quite different problems and issues turn out to have unexpected similarities, or even to be about the same issue after all. The chapters in this volume are, therefore, deliberately not clustered or put in to sections according to disciplinary overlaps or specific disciplinary links as the issues that come together around considerations of childhood thread their way through all the chapters; moreover, it is precisely this that the volume sets out to demonstrate.
Considering further precisely how and why the child is argued to be constructed in any field is the second reason, then, for this Further Approaches to Childhood. This second reason is closely interlinked with the first reason described, to do with ongoing tendencies to focus separately on social sciences' and humanities' childhood studies. For where research on childhood may have continued to change further in the past 15 years or so, there are also things which can be argued to have changed less, or not to have changed at all. In the first Children in Culture I argued that childhood was claimed as essential most of all in the humanities (literature, children's literature, history and philosophy). In these fields, claims and assertions about what real children are like underpin many of the studies. I analysed this to be the case because of an underpinning liberal humanist investment in the humanities in particular ideas of the family and emotion, where the child is the guarantee for a transcendent human emotion. This emotion in turn produces a transcendent family necessary to certain cultural and historical conceptions of moral and emotional humanity. Such a family functions as a realm of privacy in opposition to a public realm of a consumerist market which is itself upheld by its opposition to that family. Furthermore, I argued, approaches to the child as constructed were more prevalent in the social sciences, especially critical psychology and sociology. This situation, I argue, has not fundamentally changed. Although (de)constructivist approaches to the child in the humanities have been widely discussed, written about, and even much advocated, I have continued to argue both before and since the first Children in Culture that even in such works childhood often continues after all to be retrieved as 'real' in the end. 15 In other words, understandings of what constructivist approaches to childhood are and do, and what their consequences are, have a tendency to differ between the humanities and social sciences. This volume is interested in considering again how and why this is the case.
Susan Honeyman, for instance, herself writing about childhood studies from an interdisciplinary literary and cultural studies perspective in her book Elusive Childhood: Impossible Representations in Modern Fiction, 16 raises the issue of a difference between social sciences' and humanities' childhood studies in terms of children's literature critic Karen Coats's concern that 'social scientists are too likely to essentialize children, and literary critics are too likely to completely dissociate their studies from real children.'
17 Honeyman, however, in turn critiques Coats's position by arguing that Real children rarely enter the academy, ... and even if their voices do, they are eventually mediated by adults in dissemination. Coats would understandably characterize my approach as limited, but any literary study of childhood is limited to the idea of childhood according to the discursive nature of our specialisation.
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Honeyman adds in the light of this that 'confusing the concept of childhood with that of the (albeit undefinable) subject position as it may truly exist in the experiences of certain youth, many critics have glossed over the distinction between studying discourse and studying its subjects.'
19 She concludes, therefore, that in order for literary critics to avoid the accusation of 'trying to get away with amateur social science in our otherwise text-based analyses, ... we must be careful to recognise the discursive level of our expertise and respect the discursive limitations of our study.' 20 For Honeyman, this approach is not 'restrictive', but instead 'levels literary, historical and scientific sources, opening up the possibility for them all to be read as discourse, provided that we approach them as texts, not testimonies that provide us with authoritative access to "real children. " ' 21 It may be noted that although Honeyman here importantly critiques certain assumptions about 'real children', nevertheless a certain 'real' still underpins her arguments. For 'real children' and their 'voices' are known to exist in her formulations. Honeyman's argument that these are always 'eventually mediated' in dissemination makes this point further, for something has to be there in order to be 'mediated' in turn. In the same way, the child as 'idea' splits an aspect of the child away from a real which underpins, by opposing, the realm of ideas, just as 'discourse' is split off from 'its subjects' and from 'experience'. Honeyman's arguments constitute discourse or text as a level or layer on top of an underlying subject, experience, or 'true' existence, however difficult the knowing of them is argued to be. Even where the knowing of such existence or experience is claimed to be impossible by Honeyman, it is still nevertheless simultaneously claimed to be there, known as unknowable. This very existence is not 'neutral', but itself already presupposes and involves further consequences. Honeyman, in this sense, does not disagree with arguments such as those of Karen Coats in terms of the premises of their approach to the child, but in terms of how difficult they each judge the access to any knowledge of those 'real children' to be (as Honeyman's title puts it, 'elusive'). This is, therefore, a disagreement of degrees of attenuation of the real child, rather than a disagreement about definitions of reality and discourse, or the child as real or discourse.
Sociology of childhood and childhood studies especially have incorporated constructivist approaches to childhood more widely, and often more pervasively, than in the humanities. But this volume is interested in the fact that even where constructivism is accepted and forms the main approach to childhood, issues and questions remain within certain understandings of constructivism and its implications. We argue here that this is also the case for 'childhood studies' and the further social sciences studies of childhood. It is, therefore, the aim of this volume to continue with the project of the first Children in Culture in examining closely, through the juxtaposing of constructivist work in a range of fields, the workings and consequences of constructivist approaches to childhood. The main drive for this project, moreover, is a conviction shared by all the contributors that research on childhood has benefitted, and can continue to benefit in crucial ways, from such explorations and analyses. Precisely because, as Jacqueline Rose argued in her seminal 1984 book for all work on childhood (not only children's literature, its ostensible focus) The Case of Peter Pan or the Impossibility of Children's Fiction, essentialist views of childhood assume childhood as being antitheoretical by its very nature, as not requiring investigation or theorization, theoretical explorations have often been seen (and still are in some arenas) as inappropriate, or even hostile, to the child. Despite the wide acceptance of challenges to commonly held Romantic views -both academic and popular -which see the child as innocent, transparent and simple (if not simplistic), certain theoretical approaches nevertheless remain seen persistently as inappropriately complex, abstract or even obfuscating: a step too far in theorizing the child.
As the contributors of this volume explore, then, even where theoretical investigations have been welcomed, the question of the child remains a thorny issue. In our own research, the child continues to throw up unanticipated and unacknowledged questions and challenges. Not all can be ultimately resolved or addressed, and indeed, the very desire for resolution and answer may itself precisely be implicated in the questions and challenges. As Jacqueline Rose warns, '[a]nd yet for all the apparent shifts in the way that childhood is discussed, what always seems to return in the analysis, in one form or another, is this idea of mastery'. 22 Nevertheless, it remains the overarching conviction of this volume that the continued mobilization of analyses of the constitutive discourses of childhood reaps many rewards; that the ongoing process of analysis itself challenges the embedding and ossification of assumptions. The benefits, moreover, and very importantly, are not seen as being profitable only for an isolated realm of theory or some academic abstraction, in opposition to some realm of 'real life' 'out there', a muddy and messy realm of everyday endeavour, left to one side by the navelgazing theorists. Indeed, this volume questions again, from a variety of angles, this claimed opposition between 'theory' and 'experience' itself. As in my discussion of Susan Honeyman's work above, it can be said that this is an opposition that rests on the child: the 'real' or 'actual' child claimed even in much constructivist work, sometimes overtly and sometimes indirectly, to be the ultimate beneficiary of investigations of an 'ideal' or 'stereotypical' child. In such views, an 'unreal' child is to be identified by a theoretical penetration which allows precisely for the 'real' child to be seen, and heard, finally, for what it is: in this sense, constructivism is understood in such arguments as pertaining only to a layer of 'incorrectly' created or constructed childhood which rests 'on top of' an unconstructed, spontaneous, self-constituted, 'real' or 'actual' child (even when, as in Honeyman's discussion, that child is known only as existing as the unknown). In relation to this lack of working through of the implications of certain theoretical arguments, David Rudd and Anthony Pavlik argue in relation to children's literature studies in the special issue of Children's Literature Association Quarterly devoted to Jacqueline Rose's 1984 work, that 'references to Rose's work are, more often than not, en passant, and once made, the critic then proceeds as though it were "business as usual".' 23 These discussions of differing forms, definitions, and uses of (de)constructivist approaches circulate also in other identity-studies concerning, for instance, gender, ethnicity, nationality, disability and sexual identities. As critic Daniela Caselli writes in relation to gender:
Constructivist approaches have had a rather sad fate of late, being reduced, as both [queer theorists] Judith Butler and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick have often lamented, to an idea of a socially imposed (and thus dispensable and disposable) structure over something real or already there. But there would be no need for constructivism if this were the case; a plethora of political arguments in favour of social change have historically played that role. 24 It is in relation to ideas of children being able to be 'seen' or 'heard' that I wish to raise here two ongoing central issues for approaches to childhood in all fields: 'voice' and 'agency'. Both these terms relate centrally to the concerns of this volume: on the one hand to demonstrate how 'agency' and 'voice' occur and are used across a range of fields' engagements with childhood, and, on the other hand, to explore further how both these terms have a range of consequences and continue to raise a number of difficulties. Although I am focusing here specifically on 'voice' and 'agency' because of their prominent currency and purchase across a wide range of disciplines (in relation to childhood, but not just childhood), it is important also to note that what it means to 'see' the child raises theoretically parallel questions. This is demonstrated extensively in this volume in the chapters by Neil Cocks (on 'picturing' the child in art history and photography), by Jonathan Bignell (on children's television and globalization) and Jenny Bavidge (on the child and the urban, in both (children's) literature and film).
Qvortrup, Corsaro and Honig explain how and why 'agency' and 'voice' are seen by them to be central to childhood studies:
Agency and voice for children: Among those who embarked on the study of children within the framework of the new paradigm of childhood it was a common observation that children were largely appreciated as people who were on the receiving end in terms of provision and knowledge. Children were reduced to vulnerable people to be protected without being seen also as participants -in any case, not participants in the larger social fabric, which was an adult privilege and prerogative. Therefore it became imperative for social studies of childhood to look into these charges or prejudices. Was it 'naturally' or necessarily the case that children lacked qualities and capacities for participation? If this proved not to be so, were these qualities and capacities merely useful or applicable in a childhood context -because nobody would deny, of course, that children did possess resources, creativity and inventiveness. ... Social studies of childhood have made available numerous studies about children's agency in circumstances and surroundings far beyond the more narrow vicinities in which children have so far been seen as victims conceptually and empirically.
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The opposition Qvortrup, Corsaro and Honig note here between the child as agent and the child as victim is used widely. Marah Gubar, for instance, in relation to her consideration of 'the golden age of children's literature', formulates what she sees as her disagreement with Jacqueline Rose's view of childhood as follows:
Rose's ... unfortunate tendency to characterize young people as artless beings devoid of agency ... her provocative and persistent use of such rhetoric ... suggests that children are invariably exploited and oppressed by adult attention. ... the generalizations [Rose] makes about children's fiction, repeatedly characterize children as helpless pawns in the hands of all-powerful adults. As a result, the critics who adhere most closely to her argument routinely represent young people as voiceless victims. ... I believe it is too reductive to view 'representations of children as unproblematic socialization narratives which "Other", smother, and colonize the child subject'.
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Two issues can be seen to be at stake in this argument: first, the idea that to be an agent or a participant, and to have a voice, are seen, as Qvortrup, Corsaro and Honig put it, as a privilege and prerogative, or, as Gubar and many others see it, as part of children's 'resources, creativity and inventiveness'. The contributors to Further Approaches to Childhood, however, continue to explore the question of what 'agency' and 'voice' are. Are they, necessarily, the liberation from adult exploitation and oppression that critics such as Gubar would claim? And, moreover, what are precisely the 'voice' and 'agency' of childhood? What allows them to be seen as such? Qvortrup, Corsaro and Honig describe the resources of childhood being seen as something 'nobody would deny, of course', but for some of the contributors to their volume as well as for the contributors to this volume the question remains what these resources are in fact seen to be, by whom, and why. As Steedman, Urwin and Walkerdine explain in their 1985 volume Language, Gender and Childhood in relation to their writing on both childhood and gender:
[our] approach requires a form of analysis which does not simply point to the existence of either alternative forms of language or lacunae of silence as expressions of social inequality. Rather, it demands that we understand the possibilities for change by examining how forms of speaking and forms of truth have been produced, and how these regulate and circumscribe what can be said about what, when and where. In this process, we are also forced to re-analyse what constitutes subversion and resistance, and how the subjective and the political intersect.
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Using this perspective allows us to ask, for instance, when a child is seen to speak, how and why is it seen to be speaking its own voice? This issue is fundamental to difficulties surrounding both the study and the care of the child in any context, including in legal, educational or social welfare situations, where the question is often asked whether the child is not speaking the words it has been told to speak, and in this volume Simon Flynn, in considering radio productions of 'children's voices', engages closely with this complex area. Similarly, Hannah Anglin-Jaffe and Daniel Monk's chapters on children in discourses of education, specifically in relation to emotional wellbeing in the classroom and the problem of homophobic bullying respectively, raise questions of who is speaking for whom and how and why. 'Voice' is also analysed in Helen Ainslie's chapter in terms of childhood and disability as she extends the question of whether a child 'voice' can speak its 'self' into the question of whether autistic (child) narratives can speak 'autism' itself. Sarah Spooner's chapter on the work of children's writer Arthur Ransome engages with related issues in examining ideas of language for and of the child in terms of what is often still assumed to be its single outstanding characteristic: simplicity, while Sue Walsh's chapter tackles the same issue from the other side of the coin, as it were, exploring how childhood and ethnic identity are constructed in relation to the complexities of reading irony.
In all these investigations it remains crucial to stress again that there is no final 'answer' that the contributors to this volume believe they can deliver. That is to say, none of the chapters in this volume claim to be accurately able to diagnose an incorrect or artificial child 'voice' to be separated out from a correct and authentic child voice to be heard and acted upon. It is the argument of this volume, as was the case with the first Children in Culture, that there is no such 'voice', neither for the child nor for any other identity. But neither does this position, this particular understanding of (de)constructivism, claim as answer that, therefore, voice and agency are themselves the 'wrong' terms, which ought to be replaced with other, more correct or true, or more efficacious terms. As Pam Alldred and Erica Burman argue with respect to 'Analysing Children's Accounts Using Discourse Analysis':
First and foremost, discursive approaches highlight the interpretive nature of any research, not only that with children. As a consequence, they challenge the conventional distinction between data collection and analysis, question the status of research accounts and encourage us to question taken-for-granted assumptions about distinctions between adults and children. Hence our emphasis here will be on the active and subjective involvement of researchers in hearing, interpreting and representing children's 'voices'. The case has already been made for listening to children. ... however, we want to highlight processes involved in (to follow the aural metaphor) hearing what children say.
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In this sense this volume continues the engagement of the first volume with what sociologist Chris Jenks formulated in his founding collection of essays on The Sociology of Childhood as the asking of 'the basic ontological questions, "What is a child?", "How is a child possible as such?". 29 These 'ontological questions' arise both with respect to 'voice' and 'vision' ('seeing') and in the use of 'agency' in relation to the child, and continue to be central to methodological debates within childhood studies. Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn and Walkerdine explain in the 1998 'Foreword' to the re-issuing of their seminal 1984 critical psychology volume Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity that it is psychoanalysis and post-structuralism that are at the heart of the questioning of the 'subject' which in turn allows the explorations of voice and agency that both volumes of Children in Discourses rooted in the notion of a unitary, rational subject still predominate in the social sciences in spite of critiques which have shown such a concept to be untenable. ... [It] survives not so much in explicit defences of the model as in the implicit assumptions of various dualisms: social and cognitive, content and process, the intentionality of agents and determination by structures, the subject as constituted or constitutive. ... we utilized post-structuralist theories and psychoanalysis to show up the limitations that cognitivism imposes for those, who, like us, wanted to break with the tendency of psychology's research to reproduce and naturalize the particular rationalist notion of the subject.
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As Henriques et al. state, what is central here is the implication of psychoanalysis in terms of the 'splitting' of the rationalist, unitary subject not just in terms of a questioning of assumptions about the 'content' of such a rational subject, but also in terms of the perspectives of researchers themselves (as Alldred and Burman also refer to in the quote above). For the researchers too can no longer assume their own rational, unitary subjectivity in terms of a dualistic split from their object of research. The question of how and why and when researchers 'see' or 'hear' the child come to the forefront in this kind of work. Literary critic and theorist Shoshana Felman makes the same argument with respect to her account of the implications (rather than 'applications') of psychoanalysis for reading. Felman includes as an epigram a quote from the French psychoanalyst and theorist Jacques Lacan at the start of her volume Lacan here disrupts at once a unitary, intentional author and reader, as well as text as a separate object of study. As Felman further elaborates:
Literature, by virtue of its ironic force, fundamentally deconstructs the fantasy of authority ... and, for the same reasons, ... psychoanalysis deconstructs the authority of the fantasy -its claim to belief and to power as the sole window through which we behold and perceive reality, as the sole window through which reality can indeed reach our grasp, enter into our consciousness. Psychoanalysis tells us that the fantasy is a fiction, and that consciousness is itself, in a sense, a fantasy-effect.
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Taking Henriques et al. and Felman together, psychoanalysis is here the disruption of the dualities of object and subject, of viewer and viewed, of the real and fantasy, of, as Rose draws out, child and adult. These disruptions also lead to Felman articulating precisely how the issue of 'interdisciplinarity' may be thought in relation to psychoanalysis and literature, as I have also thought it above more widely with respect to the interdisciplinarities of these volumes of Children in Culture:
Since literature and psychoanalysis are different from each other, but, at the same time, they are also 'enfolded within' each other, since they are, as it were, at the same time outside and inside each other, we might say that they compromise, each in its turn, the interiority of the other. The cultural division, in other words, of scholarly 'disciplines' of research is by no means a natural geography: there are no natural boundaries between literature and psychoanalysis, which clearly define and distinguish them; the border between them is undecidable since they are really traversed by each other. actors'. 34 On the other hand, it relies on Anthony Giddens's suggestion that 'every act which contributes to the reproduction of a structure is also an act of production and as such may initiate change by altering the structure at the same time as it reproduces it.'
35 James, Giddens and Hardman allocate to children both the possibility of a self-contained culture which is not merely a retrospectively defined developmental phase in the service of adulthood as the final end-point, but an ability to be 'active participants in society ... as much contributors to its shape and form, as well as being "socialized" by it.' 36 The difference here with the (de)constructivism of Henriques et al. or Rose, however, is that these views of child agency and child culture in turn continue to rely on both an ability to 'see' what is appropriately 'child' about those particular actions and cultures, and, paradoxically, to take those actions and cultures away from adult vision altogether. As James and Prout write in their important 1990 book Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood, 'children are and must be seen as active in the construction of their own lives', 37 and 'children's social relationships and cultures are worthy of study in their own right, independent of the perspective and concerns of adults.'
38 As with Honeyman, children's social relationships and cultures are known in these statements to be there, to exist, even without adults seeing them or having concerns in relation to them. Yet in order to make the claim that these exist at all, they must have been seen and have resulted in being of concern, even if in terms of being kept 'independent'. Together with this, James relies on 'choice', by definition in her formulations conscious choice, as the correlate of agency: 'agency, in the end, is an attribute of individual children. It is something which they may or may not choose to exercise'. 39 The dualities of subject and object, of adult and child, of viewer and viewed and of passivity and activity, are finally after all upheld then, in writings such as those of James and Prout, Giddens and Hardman in ways which the implications of psychoanalysis, as understood by Felman, Rose, and Henriques et al. do not allow as possible. For James's constructivism, the child can nevertheless still be read and known as such by a vision not of the child. (In this volume, archaeologist Eleanor Casella's considerations in her chapter, for instance, of how and when and why archaeologists allocate objects or site evidence to childhood engages with these difficulties of attributing agency and autonomy to the child.) 'Individuality' too does not dissolve childhood, but instead introduces specific variation within it, both maintaining the allencompassing category of childhood for all the 'individual[s]' within it, while also assuming individuality as necessarily the smallest unit for
